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why the one body who can prevent governmental exclusions of relatively
unpopular expression should unflinchingly demand proof of some serious
evil directly caused by the expression. Any test which affords protection
only to expression whose content the Court paternally perceives as important to society is far too limited and destructive to serve the first amendment's function of free expression.
MICHAEL

B.

MINTON

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GENDER
CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE-THE
NEW STANDARD
Craig v. Boren'
Oklahoma statutes prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to females under
18 and males under 21.2 The appellants, a male between 18 and 20 when
suit was filed 3 and a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, 4 brought suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The appellants contended that, by invidiously discriminating against all males between 18 and 20, the statute
was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment.5 A three-judge federal district court6 found a
1. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
2. The statutes provide:
It shall be unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and dispense
beer. . . to sell, barter or give to any minor any beverage containing more
than one-half of one percent of alcohol measured by volume and not more
than three and two tenths (3.2) percent of alcohol measured by weight.
37 OKLA. STAT. § 241 (1953).
A "minor" for the purposes of Sections 241 . . .is defined as a female
under the age of eighteen (18) years, and a male under the age of twentyone (21) years.
37 OKLA. STAT. § 245 (Supp. 1976).
3. Appellant Craig attained the age of 21 before the case was decided. In
light of the fact that the suit was brought for declaratory and injunctive relief, tile
Court dismissed the case as to him for mootness. 97 S. Ct. at 454. See also Defunis V.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1972).
4. The Court found that this appellant had "established independently her
claim to assert jus tertii standing." 97 S.Ct. at 455. Cf. Chief Justice Berger's dissent,
Id. at 466. This note does not encompass a discussion of the "standing" issue.
5. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
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rational basis for the gender-based classification (i.e., males between 18 and
20) and upheld the statute.7 The United States Supreme Court reversed
and held the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional. 8
The fourteenth amendment does not require that absolute equality of
the laws be provided. 9 In deciding whether constitutional guarantees of
equal protection have been violated in a given situation, the Supreme
Court has developed "tests" to be applied. Where the statute or governmental action discriminates against a category drawn by race,' 0 national
origin,"I or alienage, 12 it will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.13 These
suspect classifications are presumptively invalid. The burden is on the state
to show that the classification is necessary for the accomplishment of a
compelling state interest. Justice Stewart has gone so far as to state that he
could not conceive of a valid criminal statute that discriminated on the basis
14
of race.
Closely related to cases involving a suspect classification are classifications that affect a "fundamental" right, such as the right to travel,15 the
right to vote, 16 the right of procreation, 17 and the right to privacy.' 8 Generprocess of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdictionthe equal protection of

the laws. (emphasis added)
6. A federal statute provides that no injunction against the enforcement of a
state statute shall be issued by a district court unless the application is heard by a
court of three judges. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1965).
7. Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
8. Only 37 OKLA. STAT. § 245 (Supp. 1976) was held unconstitutional,
leaving the Oklahoma legislature to redefine the word "minor" in this context.
9. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
11. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality." Id. at 100.
12. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915). Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973), with dicta
saying, "[c]lassifications based on race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
14. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
The heavy presumption of invalidity is also demonstrated by the fact that only twice
has the Supreme Court upheld discrimination based on race or national origin.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). Both of these instances occurred when the United States was
engaged in a war, and the national origin or race involved was that of the enemy.
15. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
16. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Griffon v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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ally, classifications that affect these rights are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. The Court has severely restricted the number of "fundamental"
rights by holding that they include only those rights that are "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,"' 19 i.e., they include only constitutional rights.
At the other extreme, if the statute sets out a classification drawn by
economic or social welfare it is presumptively valid. The burden is on the
one challenging the statute to show that the legislature could have had no
rationalbasis for the classification set out in the statute. 20 Where the statute
draws a classification in the area of economics or social welfare, the Court
will go to great lengths to find a rational basis for the classification and
hence uphold the statute.2 ' These two extremes define the boundaries of
what is often referred to as the Court's two-tier approach to equal protection analysis.
There are many discriminatory classifications that have not fit squarely
into either the "compelling state interest" test or the "rational basis" test.
Possibly the best example of classifications that fall between the enunciated
tests are gender-based classifications. The suspect classifications have three
elements in common, i.e., they are immutable characteristics over which
the individual has no control, 22 they are politically impotent minorities, and
they typically bear no relation to the individual's ability to perform or
contribute to society. Classifications drawn as to sex do not segregate a
politically impotent minority but they do exhibit the other two characteristics of suspect classifications.23 For this reason the Court has been faced
with a difficult task in deciding equal protection cases involving gender19. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
33-34 (1973) (the Court refused to extend the strict scrutiny analysis to a statute
affecting the right to education).
20. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (administration of a
public welfare program discriminated against large families by setting a ceiling on
the funds that could be received by any one family); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday Blue Laws discriminated in favor of certain types of
businesses); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (the challenged
statute discriminated against certain businesses selling corrective eyeglasses without
the services of licensed ophthalmologists or optometrists).
21. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949),
in which the Court found a rational basis for a statute which prohibited advertising
on the side of other people's vehicles but did not prohibit advertising on one's own
vehicle.
22. Alienage is generally an immutable characteristic only for the first five
years of residency in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1970). Consequently,
giving strict judicial scrutiny to classifications based on alienage has less support
than does giving such heavy review to classifications based on race or national
origin.
23. There are situations for which a gender based classification conceivably
bears a substantial relation to the characteristic intended to be represented by the
classification. For example, the life expectancy of females used to compute life
insurance premiums may justify lower rates for females.
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based discrimination. 24 In recent years the Court has been unsettled as to
where gender-based classifications fit into the two-tier approach to equal
protection.
From 1971 through Craigthe Supreme Court decided only five cases
in which they squarely faced the issue of what test to apply to gender-based
classifications. Reed v. Reed 25 decided the constitutionality of an Idaho
statute that gave a preference to males over females for appointment as
administrators of estates. 26 The Court, in deciding unanimously that the
statute was invalid, said "[t]he question presented by this case, then, is
whether . . . [the classification] bears a rational relationship to a state
objective . ... "27 This language led some justices to rely on Reed as precedent for applying the traditional rational basis test. However, the Reed
opinion went on to say,
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation,28so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
This often quoted language led other justices to interpret the opinion as
for the application of a stricter judicial review than mere
being precedent
29
rational basis.
In Frontiero v. Richardson30 the Court was faced with the same issue in
the context of military fringe benefits. Federal statutes3 1 provided that a
serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent and receive an extra
housing allowance as a matter of course. A servicewoman could get a
similar allowance only upon a showing of an actually dependent husband.
The Court, in a plurality opinion applying strict judicial scrutiny and
24. A more subtle reason why the task of deciding gender-based classification
cases is difficult is the pending Equal Rights Amendment. Placing these cases into
the suspect category tends to effectively "pass" the ERA and rob the legislative
branch of its function. Applying the rational basis analysis tends to endorse rejection of the amendment. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring).
25. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
26. "Of several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, males
must be preferred to females. . . ." 3 IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948) (repealed

1971).

27. 404 U.S. at 76.
28. 404 U.S. at 76, quoting, Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920). Adding to the confusion of the already ambiguous opinion is the fact that
Royster was an economic classification case that applied rational basis analysis. This
language from Royster has been used as precedent for applying strict judicial
scrutiny analysis to gender-based classification cases. See text accompanying note 33
infra.
29. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); Id, at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
30. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
31. 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1964) (amended 1973); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076
(1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/9
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explicitly stating that gender was a suspect class,3 2 held the statute invalid.
Interestingly, both the plurality, applying strict judicial scrutiny, and33Justice Powell, applying the rational basis test, found precedent in Reed.
Kahn v. Shevin3 4 dealt with the validity of a Florida statute that exempted widows, but not widowers, from state property taxes. In a 6-3 decision
the Court applied the rational basis test and held the statute valid. One year
later, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,3 5 the Court ruled on the validity of mandatory military retirement. A male officer, who had been passed over twice
for promotion, was subject to mandatory discharge while a female officer
was entitled to 13 years service, regardless of her promotion record.3 6 The
Court applied a rational basis test and held, in a 5-4 decision,37 that the
statute was valid.
In several cases decided between Reed and Craigv. Boren,38 the Court
avoided the issue of what test properly applies to gender-based classifications. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld3 9 and Stanton v. Stanton,40 the Court
found the statutory discrimination against females invalid. In both cases
the Court concluded that the activity was invalid under any test, hence, it
did not have to decide whether gender was a suspect classification. In
Geduldig v. Aiello4 the Court found that denying work loss benefits to
women who experienced normal pregnancies but not to those who experienced abnormal pregnancies was not discriminatory against all women.
The Court recognized that the classification was unique to women but held
32. 411 U.S. at 688.
33. The majority opinion stated that the appellant is contending that genderbased classifications are suspect classifications and then said: "[W]e agree and,
indeed, find at least implicit support for such an approach in our unanimous
decision only last Term in Reed v. Reed ..
" 411 U.S. at 682. In his concurring
opinion, Powell, J., said: "Reed v. Reed. . . did not add sex to the narrowly limited
group of classifications which are inherently suspect." 411 U.S. at 692. Chief Justice
Burger, who wrote the Reed opinion, joined in Powell's opinion.
34. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
35. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
36. 10 U.S.C. § 6401 (1952).
37. Mr. Justice Douglas waivered between applying strict judicial scrutiny or
rational basis analysis in Frontiero,Kahn and Ballarddepending upon whether the
discrimination was against females or males. The different split of the Court in
Kahn and Ballard is attributable to Douglas's switching.
38. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
39. 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (An action was brought challenging § 402(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), which provided that the widow of a
deceased husband would be provided survivor's benefits, but that the husband of a
deceased wife would not be granted survivor's benefits. The Court held that this
was invidious discrimination against women employees and was invalid tinder any
equal protection test.).
40. 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (The Court held that a state statute specifying a greater
age of majority for males than it specified for females, denied, in the context of a
parent's obligation for support payments for his children, equal protection of the
laws under any test.).
41. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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that there was no definable group or class being discriminated against by
the practice. In Stanley v. Illinois,42 two years later in Cleveland Board of
Elucation v. LaFleur,43 and again in Turner v. Department of Employment
irrebuttable
Security, 4 4 the Court found that the challenged statutes created
45
presumptions and therefore were constitutionally invalid.
The cases set out immediately above demonstrate the Court's reluctance to face the question of where gender-based classifications fit into the
two-tier approach to equal protection analysis. The Reed, Frontiero, Kahn,
and Ballard opinions demonstrate the difficulty the Court has had in
settling on a "test" when it has faced the question. The answer to the
resulting confusion, is that the Court has been applying neither the traditional rational basis test nor strict judicial scrutiny, but rather some middle
tier. 46 Justice Powell has candidly stated that the Court has not applied the
traditional rational basis test, declaring "[t]he relatively deferential 'rational
basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when
we address a gender based classification."47
Craig v. Boren4" recognizes a middle tier of equal protection analysis
and states the "test" as follows: "[C]lassifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of these objectives."4 9 A thorough examination of this two42. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (A state statute which provided that the children of an
unwed father automatically became wards of the state upon the death of their
mother, but where divorced, married or unmarried parents never lost their children without a hearing, was invalid as a violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.).
43. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The Court held that a requirement of mandatory
leave from teaching duties for a school teacher who was pregnant was invalid.
44. 423 U.S. 44 (1975). A state statute disallowing the payment of state
unemployment compensation to pregnant women for a period starting 12 weeks
before birth and ending 6 weeks after birth was constitutionally invalid. The Court
here relied on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine even though earlier in the
same Term they had rejected that doctrine. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975).
45. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), noted in Krause, Jury Selection-Sixth Amendment Right to Air Cross Section of the Community-A Change in
Emphasis, 41 Mo. L. REV. 446 (1976), the Court found that a state statute which
provided that women would not be put on the jury selection rolls, unless they
specifically requested such consideration, was unconstitutional. The decision was
based on the sixth amendment right to a jury of a fair cross-section of the community as applied to the state through the fourteenth amendment. Here, equal protection analysis of a gender-based classification was not in issue.
46. See, e.g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Comment, The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 129-39 (1974); Gunther, The

Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
47. 97 S. Ct. at 464, quoted from the footnote to Justice Powell's concurring
opinion.

48. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
49. 97 S. Ct. at 457. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun all
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/9
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part test is in order. The Court in Craig accepted with little discussion "the
enhancement of traffic safety" as meeting the requisite important governmental objective.5 0 In prior cases the Court has recognized that a goal of
offsetting past discrimination is also a valid state objective. 5' As a practical
matter this justification for the discrimination arises only where there is a
preference for females (i.e., discrimination against males). In the Craig
opinion the Court rejected classifications drawn because of old notions of
the proper role of females in the home and not in the business world or the
"world of ideas," as not being valid state objectives. 52
The other state objective which the Craigopinion rejects is administrative ease and convenience. 53 Virtually every classification based on gender
is a substitute for another trait or characteristic that, but for administrative
ease, could be more accurately isolated with individual determinations.
The Court could reject the state's proferred objective and declare virtually
any gender-based classification invalid as having an objective of administrative convenience. Indeed, there has been some indication that the Court
may do just that.54 This sort of reasoning by the Court is potentially
equivalent to the long defunct substantive due process methodology or the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine so clearly criticized in Weinberger v.
Salfi.55
In the second half of the Craig test, the consideration is whether the
classification is substantially related to the valid state objective. The Court
'in Craig considered various statistical evidence of the relation between
male and female drinking and traffic safety. They concluded that no
substantial relation was shown, and for this reason declared the statute
endorsed the "new test" set out. Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Powell and Chief
Justice Burger applied the rational basis test, although Powell stated that it takes on
a "sharper focus" when applied to gender-based discrimination cases. Justice Stevens stated that there is really one equal protection standard. The Stevens standard
can be paraphrased as follows: Is the statute objectionable, and if it is, is the
proffered justification for the otherwise offensive classification acceptable?
50. In accepting this as the objective of the statute the Court recognized that
this may not have been the real objective of the statute. 97 S. Ct. at 458 n.7.
51. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 519-20 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 (1974).
52. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451,457 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Craig v. Borne, 97 S. Ct. 451, 457 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). "The
administrative difficulties of individual eligibility determinations are without doubt
matters which Congress may consider when determining to rely on rules which
sweep more broadly than the evils with which they seek to deal." Id. at 784.
54. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 361-62 (1974) (White, J., dissenting);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653, 657 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77-78
(1971).
55. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 9
RECENT CASES

1977]
56

unconstitutional.
The importance to equal protection analysis of this part of the opinion
is two-fold. First is the fact that the Court considered statistical evidence at
all. When attempting to place just where the new test falls in relation to the
previous two parameters of equal protection analysis, this fact tends to put
the test closer to strict scrutiny than rational basis. It is a characteristic of
the strict judicial scrutiny test that the burden of proof of justifying the
classification is on the government. Second, the Court based its decision
partially on the fact that there was an "unduly tenuous fit" between the
classification drawn and the trait sought to be singled out (i.e., drunken
driving). In Craig, this arose out of the over-inclusiveness of the classification.57 Under the traditional "rational basis" analysis the Court has upheld
over-inclusive classifications as well as under-inclusive classifications. The
Court has rejected over-inclusiveness challenges saying that it is a first
amendment doctrine only, 58 and under-inclusiveness challenges because
the statute was valid one-step-at-a-time reform.59 Hence, again the new
"test" is dissimilar to the traditional "rational basis" analysis.
Although the Supreme Court opinions have been couched in terms of
classifications based on "gender" or "sex", indicating that discrimination
against males will be treated the same as discrimination against females,
that has not been evidenced by the results. Viewing the Supreme Court
cases from Reed through Craig on a "result-reached" basis reveals the
different treatment. In that period nine Supreme Court cases dealing with
gender-based discrimination have been decided. Six of these dealt with
discrimination against females, and in all six the discriminatory action was
found invalid. 60 In both of the cases, excluding Craig, dealing with dis56. A significant part of the Craig opinion was devoted to the effect of the
twenty-first amendment on the normal operation of the fourteenth amendment.
The state argued that the twenty-first amendment "strengthened" its power to
regulate alcohol. Therefore even if the classification was invalid under normal
equal protection analysis, it was valid in this instance. The Supreme Court, in
essence, said that the twenty-first amendment does mitigate the limitation imposed
by the Commerce Clause on the states' ability to regulate commerce, but that it does
not qualify the individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights or the fourteenth
amendment. 97 S. Ct. at 460-63. Interestingly, the state failed to argue the twentyfirst amendment within the context of the equal protection analysis. The argument,
here, would be that the "important governmental objective" is the regulation of
alcoholic beverages. The statute is, a fortiori, "substantially related to the achievement of that objective." Hence, if the Court accepts this objective, the classification
would be valid under the new "test" laid out by Craig.
57. 97 S. Ct. at 459. "The legislation imposes a restraint on one hundred
percent of the males in the class allegedly because about 2% of them have proabably
violated one or more laws relating to the consumption of alcoholic beverages." Id. at
465.
58. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
60. -In the following cases there was discriminatory state action against
females, which the Court ultimately found invalid: Turner v. Dept. of Employment
Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss3/9
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crimination against men, the Court found the discrimination valid. 6 1
Because the new test enunciated in Craig,developed from prior case
law as opposed to being completely contrary to it, that case law is still viable.
It is clear that gender-based classifications drawn to further administrative
convenience or based on old notions of females' limited role in society will
not be valid. It can be concluded that classifications discriminating against
females will be more likely held invalid than those discriminating against
males. Similarly it can be concluded that the Court has left an avenue of
escape from the strict application of the test, i.e., declaring the classifiation's objective to be administrative convenience and therefore invalid.
Finally, it should be noted that, although the decision was a convincing 7-2
for invalidation, only four Justices accepted the new test. 62 Hence the
question of what equal protection test is applicable to gender-based
63
discrimination cases cannot be deemed entirely settled.
THOMAS E. CAREW

Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). This is a case in which conduct
discriminatory on its face against women was held valid. However, the Court did
not reach that conclusion by applying equal protection analysis for gender-based
classifications. Rather, the Court found that, in this particular case, there was no
definable group being discriminated against; hence, there was no violation of equal
protection. See also, Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976) (case
brought under TITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
61. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974).
62. See note 49 supra. Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977), decided as
this note was being prepared, bears out the conclusion that the Court is still
unsettled as to where gender-based classifications fit into the two-tier approach to
equal protection. The case held, in a 5-4 decision with four Justices endorsing the
Craig test that § 402(f) of the Social Security Act discriminated against covered
female employees and was invalid. See notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text,
supra, which were written without reference to Goldfarb. Goldfarb was factually very
similar to Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). See note 39 supra.
63. Interestingly, despite all the confusion over what "test" to apply, the
Court has, in all of the gender-based classification cases since Reed, except Ballard
and Goldfarb, been clearly divided as to whom should ultimately win the case.
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